Canada’s Armed Forces in Transition: Strategic Imperatives and Capabilities for the 2030s

A New Era of Urgency

Moments of genuine urgency are rare in Canadian defence policy. For decades, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have walked a fine line between meeting global security expectations and maintaining domestic political restraint. That balance is shifting. On June 9, 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a CAD 9 billion increase in defence spending, putting Canada five years ahead of schedule for NATO’s 2% of GDP benchmark.

This was more than an accounting exercise. It was a clear signal – to allies and adversaries alike – that Canada wants to play a larger and more credible role in collective defence. Carney’s message was clear: “Now is the time to act with urgency, force and determination.” The statement acknowledged that the luxury of gradualism was over. Strategic competition is intensifying, the Arctic is becoming a competitive military space, and the United States is looking for capabilities The vital reliance on the States is no longer politically or strategically sustainable.

Tensions with the United States

The June announcement came against a backdrop of deepening US-Canada economic tensions. In late July 2025, Washington raised tariffs on most Canadian goods to 35%, exacerbating an already fraught trade dispute. The economic downturn has also spilled over into the defence sector, with American voices once again accusing Canada of “free-riding” on US security guarantees.

Carney’s decision to meet NATO spending targets early was, in part, a counter-narrative to these accusations. Yet despite the political friction, operational realities mean that interdependence is inevitable. This was underscored by the defence review of August 7, 2025, which recommended that Canada retain its full order of 88 F-35A Lightning II fighters from Lockheed Martin. The rationale was straightforward: abandoning the programme NATO will be at risk. Interoperability will be broken, sustainability will be complicated, and the CF-18 replacement schedule will be delayed – all at increased cost.

The review’s conclusion reflects a delicate balancing act in Ottawa’s strategy:

• Preserve key US-linked capabilities where they provide clear operational advantages and alliance integration
• Diversify procurement in other areas to strengthen industrial sovereignty and reduce supply-chain vulnerability

The Arctic: Canada’s strategic frontier

If there is one theatre shaping Ottawa’s current defence priorities, it is the Arctic. The region is no longer a distant buffer but the front line of strategic competition.

Russia has invested heavily in the militarization of its northern coastline – reactivating Cold War-era bases, expanding its air defence network and increasing its Arctic naval fleet to do, including ice-capable submarines. China, which calls itself the “state closest to the Arctic,” has expanded polar research stations, icebreaker programs, and shipping ventures, all with clear dual-use capabilities.

Canada’s response is built on two strategic imperatives:

• Seeing: Deploying Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) as part of the NORAD modernization, in partnership with Australia’s JORN program. These radar systems will provide continuous surveillance over thousands of kilometers, detecting both air and… sea-based threats from afar. Beyond the curvature of the Earth.
• Reaching: Ensuring that the CAF can move capable forces rapidly into the Arctic and sustain them for long periods. This requires ice-capable ships, long-range patrol aircraft, drones, expeditionary logistics, and hardened northern bases.

Current Measures and Assets

Harry DeWolf-class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) are central to Canada’s sovereignty operations in the North.

• Strengths: Ice-strengthened hulls, months-long endurance, helicopter embarkation capability, and modular payload space make them ideal for presence missions, search and rescue, and constabulary duties.
• Limitations: Lack of light weapons and advanced combat systems limits their deterrent value against peer-state threats.

Infrastructure and Readiness

Arctic defence is not just about platforms. Without adequate infrastructure – deep-water ports, fuel depots, ammunition storage, and repair facilities – even the most capable ships and aircraft will struggle to operate effectively. Currently, Canada’s northern basing network is limited, a shortcoming that adversaries will exploit if left unresolved.

Royal Canadian Navy: Renewal Underway

Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is at the heart of Ottawa’s modernization agenda, undergoing its most comprehensive renewal since the Cold War.

Current Core Capabilities

• CF-18 Hornet (CF-188): Life extended through the Hornet Extension Project, still serving in air sovereignty and expeditionary roles.
• CP-140 Aurora: Multi-mission maritime patrol aircraft with ASW capabilities, nearing end of service by 2030.
• CH-148 Cyclone helicopter: Rides aboard naval ships for ASW and surface surveillance.
• CH-147F Chinook: Heavy-lift helicopter for tactical mobility.
• CC-130J Hercules and CC-177 Globemaster III: Provide tactical and strategic airlift.
• CH-146 Griffon: Multi-role utility helicopter to remain in service until 2030 under a limited life extension program.
• Search and Rescue Assets: CC-295 Kingfisher and CH-149 Cormorant helicopters.

Modernization and Future Systems

• F-35A Lightning II (88 aircraft): Replaces CF-18, deliveries begin in 2026. Brings stealth, advanced sensors, and sensor fusion for both air defense and air attack.
• P-8A Poseidon (up to 16): Replaces CP-140, provides modern ASW, ISR, and maritime strike capabilities.
• MQ-9B SkyGuardian RPAS: Long-endurance unmanned surveillance aircraft capable of Arctic operations, with potential for air strike missions pending policy decisions.
• CC-330 Husky (A330 MRTT): Strategic tanker/transport with long-range air-to-air refueling and medevac capability.
• CH-146 Griffon Limited Life Extension: Upgrades to avionics and systems to extend service life.

Capability Implications and Shortcomings

The future RCAF force will:

• Enhance Arctic sovereignty through sustained ISR (P-8A, MQ-9B) and fighter patrols (F-35A)
• Strengthen NATO commitments through interoperable aircraft and refueling capability (CC-330)
• Expand ASW capability in coordination with the RCN

Immediate Challenges:

• Fighter transition gap* as the CF-18 fleet ages before sufficient F-35A squadrons reach operational readiness
• Ground-based air defence for local and deployed forces remains underdeveloped
• Arctic basing and infrastructure requires expansion to support new platforms

Canadian Army: Capable but Expanded

The Canadian Army is a critical component of Canada’s defence commitments The backbone remains, especially in the eastern part of NATO and in local operations. It has a balanced mix of heavy armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery, but faces persistent gaps in air defense, long-range firepower, and personnel strength.

Current core capabilities

• Leopard 2A4/2A6 main battle tanks: Provide secure firepower in both conventional combat and peacekeeping missions.
• LAV 6.0 infantry fighting vehicles: Provide improved mobility, protection, and digital systems for modern mechanized operations.
• TAPV (Tactical Armored Patrol Vehicle): Armored reconnaissance and patrol platform.
• M777 155mm howitzer: Lightweight, precision-guided artillery with a range of over 30 km; some have been donated to Ukraine, reducing local inventories.
• Infantry Weapons: C7/C8 Rifles, C6/C9 Machine Guns, Carl-Gustaf M4 Recoilless Rifles, TOW-2 Anti-Tank Guided Missiles.
• Combat Engineering Assets: Bridging, breaching, and water purification systems.

Modernization and Future Systems

• Military Systems: Improved personal protection, integrated communications, and enhanced night-vision devices.
• Ground-Based Air Defense (GBAD) and Counter-UAS: RBS 70 NG systems deployed with NATO missions in Latvia provide short-range coverage; Canada has also donated NASAMS to Ukraine, highlighting local ranges.
• Electronic Warfare and Cyber ​​at Brigade Level: Expanding the ability to operate in drone- and EW-contested environments.
• Uncruised Ground Vehicles (UGVs): Tests for autonomous logistics and reconnaissance support.

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Capability Impacts and Shortcomings

The objective of force modernization is to:

• Maintain a credible heavy/medium combined arms capability for NATO operations
• Improve survivability through integrated GBAD and counter-drone systems
• Enhance battlefield awareness with digitized C2 and modern sensors

Continuous gaps include:

• No comprehensive layered GBAD for local and expeditionary forces
• Limited long-range precision fire compared to allied adversaries
• Recruitment and retention shortfalls impacting deployable force strength

Cyber, Space and Integrated Defence

Modern warfare is inherently multi-domain, and Canada is investing in capabilities for the contested areas of cyberspace and space.

Cyber

**The establishment of the *Canadian Armed Forces Cyber ​​Command (CAFCYBERCOM)* ​​in 2024 formalizes the CAF’s authority to:

• Defensive cyber operations to protect military and national networks
• Mission assurance to counter adversarial cyber activity
• Offensive cyber options, coordinated with Five Eyes partners, within legal and policy constraints*

Space

Prioritizes include:

• Secure satellite communications to ensure resilient C2 across Canada’s vast territory
• Space domain awareness to track and characterize objects in orbit
• ISR integration of space-based data with ground-based and airborne sensors

Integrated C4ISR

The goal is to connect sensors and shooters across all domains:

• Over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) for early detection
• P-8A Poseidon* and MQ-9B for maritime and Arctic ISR
• CSC combat systems for real-time targeting and engagement

Acquisition timeline

2025–2027

• F-35A deliveries begin; Pilot and maintainer training increased
• Initial OTHR site development under NORAD modernization
• CC-330 MRTT conversion for first operational tankers completed
• Harry DeWolf-class AOPS and JSS entry into service continued delivery
• MQ-9B RPAS training infrastructure established

2028–2032

• P-8A delivery and CP-140 retirement
• OTHR achieves initial operational capability
• CSC construction accelerates, first ships delivered late in the decade
• Land-based air defense decisions implemented

2032–Late 2030s

• Full operational capability for F-35A fleet
• Serial production of CSC destroyers
• Canadian Patrol Submarine Project delivers first ice-capable submarine

Funding for transformation

**CAD 9 billion increase in the 2025-26 continuing funding plan is an initial step. Ottawa’s approach combines:

• Multi-year allocations for stability
• Industrial and Technology Benefits (ITBs) to develop domestic defence industries
• Phase payments to manage large procurement programs
• Joint cost-sharing for joint projects such as the NORAD modernization

Financial risks include:

• Tariff-based trade tensions with the US reduce fiscal flexibility
• Inflationary pressures drive up procurement costs
• Labour shortages in shipbuilding and aerospace sectors slow deliveries

Conclusion: From announcements to results

Canada’s modernization program is both ambitious and lengthy, representing a deliberate shift away from the gradualism that has defined its defence policy for decades. The vision is to create a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) that is balanced across multiple domains, capable of operating independently in the Arctic, and can make meaningful contributions to NATO and allied missions abroad.

If fully realized by the early 2030s, the CAF could:

• Maintain integrated Arctic surveillance and rapid response using over-the-horizon radar, long-range patrol aircraft, CRUD systems, and modern surface and subsurface fleets.
• Deploy blue-water naval task forces with their own replenishment and logistics, independent of allied maintenance.
• Operate multiple combat-ready F-35A squadrons integrated into allied C4ISR networks for both NORAD and NATO operations.
• Provide layered air and missile defense for local infrastructure, Arctic installations, and forward-deployed forces.
• Lead NATO battle groups with modern ground forces ready for high-intensity combat in a competitive environment.

These goals are strategically sound, but many ongoing challenges will need to be addressed to achieve them.

Time horizon and capability gap

Many major programs – including the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, the full Canadian Surface Combatant Fleet and the National Layered Air Defence Network – will take a decade or more to reach operational maturity. This leaves a capability gap in which aging systems will have to be maintained beyond their optimal service life, increasing both costs and operational risk.

During this transition period:

• Canada will rely on allies for submarine patrols under the ice, long-range missile defence and sustained Arctic air coverage.
• Adversaries, particularly Russia and China, will continue to expand their capabilities in this area, potentially outpacing Canada’s modernization timeline.

Political Will and Strategic Continuity

Canada’s defence procurement history is marked by reversals and delays – from the Sea King helicopter replacement to the drawn-out F-35 debate. Multi-decade programs are inherently vulnerable to changes in government and shifting financial priorities.

To avoid repeating this pattern, Ottawa will need:

• Cross-party consensus to protect key programs from partisan interference.
• Firm requirements discipline to prevent mid-program scope changes.
• Public engagement that directly links defence investment to sovereignty, Arctic security and industrial benefits.

Without this continuity, modernization risks becoming a patchwork of partial deliveries.

Industrial Capacity and Economic Constraints

The success of this plan is tied to the capacity of Canada’s domestic defence industry. While the shipbuilding and aerospace sectors stand to benefit from major contracts, both face:

• Skilled labour shortages.
• Supply chain fragility for critical components.
• Inflationary pressures on materials and labour.

Despite pressure to diversify suppliers, Canada will remain dependent on U.S. sustainability pipelines for certain systems – a potential strategic vulnerability if trade disputes or tariffs escalate.

Fiscal Sustainability

A CAD 9 billion increase in 2025-26 is a strong start, but sustaining higher spending will require either strong GDP growth or a politically difficult reset. Historically, Canada has had little tolerance for high peacetime military spending. In an economic downturn or a protracted trade dispute with the United States, defence could once again be among the first budget lines targeted for cuts.

Alliance Expectations and Burden-Sharing

Meeting NATO’s 2% benchmark early has given Canada political capital, but it also raises expectations. Allies will now look for:

• Deployable Arctic and naval assets that can operate year-round in northern waters.
• A sustained contribution to NATO’s forward presence in Europe.
• Credible expeditionary capabilities beyond North America.

In NORAD, Washington sees a capable Canadian Arctic presence as a key requirement for continental defence. Failure to deliver could provoke unilateral US action in the North, effectively eroding Canadian sovereignty.

Arctic Competition and Operational Realities

The Arctic will be the true test of Canada’s modernization. Russia continues to invest heavily in Arctic-capable submarines, bombers, and coastal defense, while China expands its polar logistics and icebreaking fleet. Canada faces three major operational challenges:

• Infrastructure: Limited ports, runways, and fuel depots north of 60°N.
• Logistics: Harsh weather and vast distances slow deployment and resupply.
• Speed ​​of Response: Despite modern assets, rapid response relies on pre-positioned resources and trained personnel.

Comparative NATO Context

Canada’s position among mid-tier NATO forces is unique: few Allies have to defend such a vast, harsh climate and sparsely populated territory while contributing to global engagement missions. If modernization is successful, Canada could join a select group of allies with:

• Full-spectrum maritime capabilities, including under-ice patrols.
• Fifth-generation fighters integrated into allied networks.
• Independent sustainment capabilities for extended deployment.

Otherwise, it risks remaining a niche contributor dependent on others for key constraints.

Strategic Outcomes

Success will depend on whether Canada can align political will, industrial implementation, and financial commitment over a decade or more. Two possible futures emerge:

• Full success: A balanced, self-sufficient, Arctic-capable CAF by the mid-2030s, with modern ships, submarines, aircraft, and land forces capable of operating independently and contributing proportionately to NATO.
• Partial Delivery: Some capabilities have been realized, but gaps remain in submarines, Arctic infrastructure, and missile defense, leaving Canada dependent on allies for critical tasks.

The modernization drive is not just about acquiring hardware—it’s about deciding what kind of military power Canada wants to be. The strategic choice is clear: either emerge as a credible, balanced, and sovereign defender of national interests, or rely on allies whose Canadian capabilities to fill the gaps will not survive in an increasingly competitive world.

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